Our purpose in this paper is to examine how one might evaluate and measure the contribution of public infrastructure capital on private sector output and productivity growth in Sweden. We do this by specifying and implementing empirically a number of alternative econometric models, using annual data for Sweden from 1960 to 1988.
Introduction
Although much attention in macroeconomics has been focused on the effects of goverrunent spending on private sector output and productivity growth, and even though private sector capital accumulation has long been studied in terms of its effects on economic growth and productivity, surprisingly little consideration has been given to the corresponding effects of public infrastructure capital stock formation. By public infrastructure capital stocks, we refer to the highways, airports, mass transit facilities, water supplies, sewer systems, police and fire stations, courthouses and public garages, etc., that provide an environment in which private production is facilitated.
As David Aschauer (1989] and Alicia Munnell [1990a,b] , among others, have recently emphasized, this relative neglect of public infrastructure capital is particularly startling, for the amount of such infrastructure capital is substantial, both absolutely and relatively.1 Munnell [1990a, The rough coincidence of this slowdown in public infrastructure capital formation with the much-discussed decline in productivity growth in both these countries is striking. A back of the envelope calculation reveals further that the simple correlation between annual multifactor productivity growth in Sweden's private business sector and the growth rate of its public infrastructure capital stock from 1961 to 1988 is 0.55, while that between productivity growth and the growth rate of this infrastructure stock lagged one year is 0.65. Is there in fact a relationship between public infrastructure capital formation and the productivity growth slowdown in Sweden?
Or, as has been conjectured by Charles Schultze [1990] , is this correlation simply a temporal coincidence, without any cause-effect implications?
Our purpose in this paper is to examine how one might evaluate and measure the contribution of public infrastructure capital on private sector output and productivity growth. We do this by specifying and implementing empirically a number of alternative econometric models using annual data for Sweden from 1960 to 1988.
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The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section II we begin by summarizing and critiquing the theoretical framework and empirical results reported in several recent studies of public infrastructure capital formation based on US data. In Section III we provide an alternative theoretical framework, using modern duality theory. Then in Section IV we discuss measurement issues and econometric implementation. In Section V we report empirical results for the total private business sector in Sweden, and in Section VI we focus on the manufacturing sector only. Finally, in Section VII we present a summary of our findings and provide suggestions for future research.
II.
Brief Review of Literature
The literature on modeling the contribution of public infrastructure capital to economic growth is substantial; much of it is in the context of regional economics and economic development.3 A common specification in this literature is that of a production function relating value-added output Q to the quantities of labor input L, private capital input 5, and public infrastructure capital K:
Q -F(L, 5, K1).
(1)
In an early theoretical article, James E. Aschauer (1989J and Alicia H. Munneil [1990a,b} are of particular interest to us. We now briefly summarize their findings.
Aschauer assumes that the production function in (1) where in is the natural logarithm, u is a traditional stochastic disturbance term, and the degree of returns to scale over all inputs is equal to a1 + a2 + a3 + 1. Aschauer also derives and estimates a productivity equation having the form
where A is the normalized level of inultifactor productivity computed from a Divisia index of growth in output Q minus growth in the private inputs L and and v is a random disturbance term. Note that Meade's unpaid factor and atmosphere models are testable special cases of (2) 
and with the three alternative returns to scale specifications. In the unrestricted version analogous to (4), returns to scale are equal to d1 + d2 + d3. Munnell where t-statistics are in parentheses; the R2 is 0.993, and the standard error of the regression is 0.088. The implied elasticity of output with respect to infrastructure capital is 0.15, which is positive and statistically significant, but is considerably smaller than the 0.31 . 0.39 estimates reported in the studies by Munnell (1990a] -1), the fit is only marginally affected (the R2 fails to 0.992 and the SER increases to 0.090), but when Meade's "unpaid factor" returns to scale constraints are introduced (d1 + d2 + d3 -1), the goodness of fit declines considerably (the R2 is 0.990, but the SER increases to 0.102). Munneil reports similar findings when the infrastructure capital is disaggregated into stock of highways, stock of water and sewer systems, and stock of other state and local public capital (primarily buildings). Finally, the value of the elasticity of output with respect to labor input (0.59) relative to that with respect to private capital (0.31) is more in line with the conventional wisdom, although the 0.59/0.31 ratio is still less than 3:1.
One implication of the use of the Cobb-Douglas functional form in these studies is that the L, Ki and 5 inputs are assumed to be substitutable inputs, implying that increases in Kj are by assumption specified to increase the average and marginal productivity of the labor and private capital inputs.
In an effort to gain more information about substitutability relationships among inputs, Munnell estimated parameters of a translog production function, A more appropriate approach, we believe, is to follow developments of the last two decades in modern duality theory and to specify a variable cost function dual to a production function --a cost function that reflects the optimizing behavior of individual firms.8 In the present context, for example, one can specify a variable cost function for the private sector in which firms are envisaged as attempting to produce a given level of output at minimum private variable cost, conditional on quantities of fixed inputs such as Kj and perhaps K.1,, where private variable costs include labor, and perhaps energy and other non-energy intermediate materials. In the next section, we outline this alternative theoretical framework, and show how it permits us to measure benefits of public infrastructure capital, or more precisely, how to obtain measures of the shadow value of this capital.
III. An Alternative Theoretical Framework
In the economic theory of cost and production, the notion of a production function plays a central role. Essentially, a production function is an engineering notion revealing the maximum possible output Q that can be produced within a time period, given quantities of the inputs x1, x2,...,x.
A useful way of viewing the production function relationship is to think of it
as a book whose pages contain alternative blueprint designs for combining inputs to produce output level Q. Clearly, the production function and the book of blueprints must be consistent with laws of nature and other engineering relationships. While laws of nature are by definition stable and do not change over time, our understanding and discovery of these laws, as well as our ability to exploit technological possibilities, has improved with time. One way of accounting for such advances in the state of technical knowledge, therefore, is to think of them as adding new pages to the book of blueprints. For such reasons, often a time counter variable "t" is included in the production function relationship.
Economic content can be added to the notion of a production function if one assumes that firms optimize. In particular, assume that the prices of inputs purchased by the firm are given (call these prices p), and that conditional on the level of output Q and other environmental factors beyond the firm's control, called Z (including the state of technical knowledge t,
but also other variables), firms choose quantities of the inputs so as to minimize the private costs of producing output Q. Given standard continuity and regularity conditions on the production function, according to modern duality theory there exists a cost function dual to the production function, having the general form
where C is the total private cost of purchasing the input quantities xj at prices Pj. The dual cost function is increasing in Q and in p, and is homogeneous of degree one in p.
When private firms optimize, they take into account the environment in which they operate. One of these environmental variables is the state of technical knowledge, which, although typically exogenous to the firm, affects
its production possibilities. Another environmental variable affecting production relationships but exogenous to the firm is the amount of available public infrastructure capital Ki. Since both the t and Ki variables affect the production function, they also influence cost relationships. It is therefore useful to specialize the Z inputs in the dual cost function (10) and
to re-write it as
Among the n inputs, it is often the case that some inputs (such as private capital stocks of structures and equipment) are fixed in the short- is the sum of short-run costs over the variable inputs. Following I'aul A. Samuelson (1953] , one can specify a short-run or variable private cost function, written as C,,, -h(Q.PvKpKi.t).
A concept that will be of particular use to us in this paper is the notion of the shadow value of the public infrastructure capital stock Kj.
Holding other things fixed, one can assess the impact on the private firm's costs of there being an exogenous increase in the amount of available public infrastructure capital, i.e., one can compute the marginal benefits to the private sector (in terms of reduced costs) of there being an increase in K1.
For the total private cost function (11), define the shadow value of infrastructure capital B as B1 --ÔC/aKj > 0, (13) and for the variable private cost function (12), define the corresponding shadow value Bj as vi --ac,/aKi > 0.
For the private sector firm minimizing short-run variable costs, there is also a shadow value relationship involving its private capital stock.
Accordingly, define the shadow value of private capital B as
If the private sector firm were in long-run equilibrium with respect to its private inputs, then the marginal benefits of K would just equal its marginal costs. Call the ex ante one-period price of private capital PK. Then at this long-run equilbrium point, the optimal amount of private sector capital K; is that amount at which marginal benefits equal marginal costs, i.e..
Factors affecting the optimal provision of public (rather than private)
infrastructure capital }( are more complex, and may involve normative issues of equity; for a discussion of issues underlying the optimal amount of public goods, see the chapters of modern public finance textbooks, such as that by 
One other result from duality theory will also be of importance to us.
By assumption, private sector firms choose quantities of variable inputs so as to minimize private variable costs, given the constraints expressed in (12).
It turns out that the optimal, variable cost-minimizing quantities of the variable inputs 4 simply equal the derivative of (12) with respect to i.e.,
-
This empirically useful result is typically known as Shephard's Lemma; for a discussion end derivation, see W. Erwin Diewert (1974J. In order to implement this theory of cost and production empirically, and to estimate shadow values of private and public capital in Sweden, we must gather appropriate data and specify mathematical functions for the cost functions (11) and (12). To this we now turn our attention.
IV.
Data and Econometric Inrnlementation
The production and input data used in this study consist of prices and quantities for variable inputs (labor -L, energy -E, non-energy materials - Wykoff [1980,1981) capital stock that excludes the electricity generation and distribution sector. The 1960-88 time series of Ki excluding electricity is also given in Table A -i in the appendix to this paper.
In terms of econometric implementation, our immediate task is to specify functional forms for the variable cost functions such as (11) and (12). The specifications we employ differ depending on the measure of output employed.
In particular, when value-added is the measure of output (as it is in the case of the private business sector), the only variable input is labor, and in this case the variable cost function reduces to an input requirement function relating labor input to Q, K. K, and t. However, when gross output is used as the measure of output (it and value-added are alternative measures of output in the manufacturing sector), the variable cost function becomes more complex, incorporating not only Q, 5, Kj and t, but also prices of the variable inputs.
We begin with the specification for value-added output. One convenient functional form for the labor input requirement function is the following, analogous to that considered in Hansson [1991aJ ( 
For estimation, to avoid potential problems with heteroskedasticity, it is useful to divide both sides of (19) by Q, thereby having L/Q as the dependent One convenient feature of the specification in (19) is that, using the marginal benefit equal marginal cost conditions in (16) and (18), one can solve for optimal amounts of 4 and 4, provided that in the latter case one restricts benefits to those accruing to the private business sector (and excludes those infrastructure benefits enjoyed by final demand consumers).
These optimal capital stock levels turn out to be K; -
where 2 J -1and -.
[ j-
In the econometric implementation, an additive disturbance term is appended to the L/Q equation based on (19) One possibility, in the tradition of Dale W. Jorgenson [1986] , is to treat all the L, E, M and K inputs as variable, as in (11). Letting Q now be gross output rather than value-added, following Hansson [199la) 
Demand equations for L, E and M can be derived analogously.
For econometric implementation, an additive disturbance term is appended to each of the five equations (the cost function (22) With no constraints placed on returns to scale, use of Aschauer's equation (2) and 1964-88 annual data for Sweden resulted in the following estimated model: As is seen in (27), the L/Q input-output coefficient is affected by 5 and K in a nonlinear fashion. We have computed the short-run elasticity of demand for private labor with respect to private capital, and with respect to public capital, that are implied by these parameter estimates. These shortrun elasticity estimates vary considerably over the sample, even in sign. All that can be said in general is that during the 1960's and late 1980's, private labor and private capital were short-run substitutable inputs (the estimated elasticity of L with respect 5 was negative), while private labor and public capital were short-run complementary inputs (the estimated elasticity of L with respect to K was positive);20 during the 1970's and up to the mid 1980's, the signs were reversed.
Of particular interest to us is the calculation of the optimal private and optimal public infrastructure capital stocks implied by equating the estimated shadow values (marginal benefits) of these stocks to their ex ante rental prices, as formulated in equations (16), (17), (20) and (21). We have computed these optimal capital stocks, and have then calculated the ratio of the optimal capital stock K* to the actual capital stock K, by year for 5 and for Kj. Results of this calculation are presented in Table 2 below.
Before discussing these estimates, we believe it useful to remind readers that in the case of the public infrastructure capital Kj, use of (17) and (21) are not incorporated), ceteris paribus, the ratio of K to Ki is also understated. Moreover, since the optimal private capital stock K; rises with decreases in the one-period rental price of private capital PK. ceteris Daribus, to the extent that PK. is overstated owing to the fact that corporate taxes are not incorporated into the measure of PK (and on this see footnote 9), the ratio of K; to Iç is understated. Hence, there is some reason to We begin with the ratio of optimal to actual private sector capital stocks. As is seen in Finally, to assess the effects on private sector productivity growth of changes in the public infrastructure capital stock, we have undertook several historical and counterfactual simulations. Specifically, we first computed "actual" private business sector multifactor productivity (MFP) growth using historical data on output growth minus growth in aggregate input, where actual K.1, growth is weighted by the ex ante rental price of capital PK.1,; we call this actual growth series MFPa.
Second, to purge from this MFPa series the effects of K not being in long-run equilibrium, we used the historical data series on PK. L' Q t and K1, as well as parameter estimates from (27), to compute optimal private * * * capital K; we then calculated the corresponding optimal L given K. Q, t and K1. Finally, we constructed the corresponding aggregate input series over L* and 4 using the Divisia index procedure, and then we obtained an MFP series as growth in output minus growth in this long-run equilibrium but counterfactual aggregate input. We call this private sector equilibrium productivity series MFPe, reflecting the fact that it simulates private sector productivity growth had it been in long-run equilibrium. Note that any differences between MFP5 and MFPe reflect the effects of the private sector capital stock being out of long-run equilibrium.
Third, there are several alternative ways by which one might investigate the effects on private sector MFP of varying growth paths of infrastructure capital Kj. For example, one could fix for the entire 1960-88 sample the ratio of K1 to Q from some chosen year (say, 1960. 1974 or 1988) , generate a counterfactual K series given historical growth in Q, calculate private * * 8 sector long-run optimal K. and L given this new I(i series, and then compute the implied rate of MFP growth. While interesting, these results would vary with choice of the benchmark year (1960, 1974 or 1988) , and thus interpretation would be problematic. This consideration led us to employ as an alternative K1 series that amount of K1 that could be rationalized by private business sector cost savings, i.e. we solved (20) and (21) to obtain 4 an 4, inserted these values into (19) to obtain L*, and then computed MFP growth as growth in output minus growth in this counterfactual but optimal aggregate private input; we call this optimal productivity growth series MFP0.
The results of our calculations are presented in Table 3 below. In the first row of In the bottom row of Table 3 we report HFP growth had the public infrastructure capital been optimal (Kj -4), as viewed through private business sector cost savings. There it is seen that had Kj -4, then private sector long-run optimal MFP growth would have been lower from 1960 to 1973 (3.920% vs. 4.290%), it would have been higher from 1974 to 1988 (1.538% vs. 1.188%), and thus the MFP growth slowdown would have been 60.8%, rather than the actual 72.3%. The marginal impact of optimal 4, assuming private sector long-run equilibrium, is to reduce the slowdown by 6.1% ((0.652 -0.608)/0.723), and the cumulative impact of private and public sector disequilibrium is to reduce the private sector MFP growth slowdown by 15.9% ((0.723 -0.608)/0.723).
We conclude, therefore, that while reduced infrastructure capital investment in Sweden since 1974 has contributed to the productivity growth slowdown in the private business sector, this impact has been rather modest.21
Much of the productivity growth slowdown is apparently still "unexplained", although Hanssons (l991b) results provide intriguing evidence that reduced exploitation of scale economies may have played a very prominent role.
This completes our discussion of empirical results obtained for the private business sector. We now provide some preliminary, more detailed evidence using data from one sector within the aggregate private business sector, namely, the manufacturing sector.
VI.
Results: The Hanufacturin Sector in Sweden We have also computed optimal private and public capital stocks, assuming that benefits in the form of reduced labor costs accrue only to the manufacturing sector. Our estimates are given in Table 4 above. A number of results are worth noting.
First, somewhat surprisingly, the ratio of optimal to actual private capital in manufacturing is less than one in all years, with its high value of 0.994 in 1964 and a lowest value of 0.690 in 1988; although there are a few wiggles in the late 1970's, this ratio falls rather steadily ever since 1970.
These results imply that in the Swedish manufacturing sector, the amount of underutilization of capital is considerable, and that this underutilization has increased in the last two decades.
With respect to public capital, a priori one would expect that if one computed benefits as reduced labor costs for only the manufacturing sector, the amount of public capital rationalized by this cost saving would be less than if benefits included the entire private business sector. Hence, one would expect the ratio of optimal to actual viewed from the vantage of the manufacturing sector to be less than that when assessed from the viewpoint of the entire private business sector. For the most part, this is what we find.
With the exception of the beginning years in the sample (1960.63) , the ratio of 4 to is smaller in Table 4 (for manufacturing only) than in Table 2 (for the entire private business sector). As seen in the ratio of optimal to actual Ki capital is presented in Table 6 below, as are corresponding ratios for 5 capital, which in this case is assumed to be a variable input.
As in seen in Table 6 , for the private capital input 5, the ratio of optimal to actual 5 is on average about unity, and it has a U-shaped tine trend, above unity at the beginning of the sample, a minimum value of 0.037 in 1978, and then it rises at the end of the sample. This U-shaped pattern implies of course an autocorrelated residual, which in turn might reflect a misspecification in treating 5 as a variable rather than a quasi-fixed input. Tatom [1991) , and Dale V. Jorgenson [1991] .
2This issue has also been of considerable interest recently in the policy arena. See, for example, Svenska Vugfureningen [1990) .
3For references, see the citations in Alicia Munneil [l990a,b), Kaven T. Deno (1988] , Jacob De Rooy [1978] and Koichi Mera (1973] . For a more general discussion, see V. Erwin Diewert [1980 Diewert [ , 1986 .
1'Yet another notion of external economies involving spillovers among private sectors has been considered by Ricardo J. Caballero and Richard K. Lyons [1989] .
5For important studies in this context, see Robert E. Hall [1988a,b] , Paul Romer [1986] and Catherine 3. Morrison (1989] .
6Aschauer's estimated productivity equation (3) which indicates that increases in in 1(, ceteris paribus, have a strong and significant positive impact on multifactor productivity. 7lnterestingiy, although Aschauer considers the simultaneous equations bias issue, he focuses on the correlation of Kj with the equation disturbance term, which could occur if current government spending "surprises: affected both Q and K. Aschauer re-estimates his equations by two-stage least squares using lagged Ki as an instrument, and finds his results are essentially the same as those obtained by OLS.
8For a review of recent developments in the econometric implementation of models of cost and production, see Berndt [1991] , especially chapter 9, "Modeling the Interrelated Demands for Factors of Production: Estimation and Inference in Equation Systems".
91n private conversations with Jan Sodersten, we have learned that in many cases, assuming the marginal corporate tax rate is zero may well be a realistic assumption.
'°For a discussion of measurement issues involved in constructing capital stocks, see, among others, Berndt [1991) , especially chapter 6, section 1, "Investment and Capital Stock: Definitions and General Framework."
The private business sector is an aggregate of agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hospitals, parking and leasing, other passenger land transport, freight transport by road, water transport, supporting services to land transport, post office services, telecommunications, financial institutions, insurance and letting of other premises, business services and personal services.
12See Hausman [1978) for an elaboration on this teat.
'3The data begin in 1964 rather than 1960 since time series on CU in Sweden are not available before 1964.
'4The returns to scale restriction in Meade's atmosphere (constant returns to scale in private inputs K. and L) specification is decisively rejected, for the x2 test statistic with 1 degree of freedom is 24.1468, much larger than the critical value at any reasonable level of significance. Similarly. Meade's unpaid fact2r (constant returns to scale in all inputs) model is also rejected, for the XL test statistic with 1 degree of freedom is 16.1924, which also is larger than the critical value at usual significance levels. Finally, since the Durbin-Watson test statistic was in the inconclusive region, we estimated this equation using the maximum likelihood procedure with an AR(].) stochastic disturbance specification. The unsatisfactory results remained. Specifically, the coefficients (absolute values of t-statistics) on ln L, ln and in Kj were, respectively, 0.856 (3.05), -1.402 (4.23) and 1.278 (3.77). 15When in K1 was excluded entirely as an input, the estimated returns to scale fell to 0.773. t6The results we obtained were much more reasonable when In CU was employed rather than CU. 17w1th in Ki is excluded entirely, the estimated returns to scale fall drastically to 0.484.
18Results deteriorate further when an AR(l) model is estimated.
19The instruments used in the first-stage regression of 2SLS include in addition to the constant term, t, K1,, and K1, real gross domestic product in Europe, real gross domestic product in the US, the 5-year Swedish government bond yield, total hours worked in the local government sector, and total hours worked in the central government sector, as well as nonlinear transforms of these variables.
20Note that these substitutability, complementarity relationships are similar to those reported by Munneil [l990b], based on the translog production function.
210ne can also compute the elasticity of private sector multifactor productivity growth with respect to changes in the stock in public infrastructure capital; this elasticity varies by year, and in our sample it ranges from a low of 0.058 in 1960 to a high of 0.171 in 1985; in 1988, the last year of our sample, this elasticity was 0.149, very similar to the 0.15 elasticity reported by Munnell [1990bJ in her pooled cross-section, time series estimation using US data by state. 22 this, however, see footnote 9.
23There is a very large literature on this issue. For a recent discussion, see Robert C. Lind [1982] .
